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Abstract14
15
The sensitivity for identification of high-Z objects in elemental form in the massive cargos of 16
intermodal containers with continuous bremsstrahung radiation depends critically on 17
discriminating the weak signal from uncollided photons from the very intense flux of scattered 18
radiations that penetrate the cargo. We propose that this might be accomplished by rejection of 19
detected events with E ≤ 2-3 MeV that contain the majority of multiply-scattered photons along 20
with a correction for single-scattered photons at higher energies. Monte Carlo simulations of 21
radiographs with a 9-MeV bremsstrahlung spectrum demonstrate that rejection of detected 22
events with E ≤ 3 MeV removes the majority of signals from scattered photons emerging 23
through cargos with Z ≤ 30 and areal densities of at least145 g cm-2. With analytical estimates of 24
the single-scattered intensity at higher energies, accurate estimates of linear attenuation 25
coefficients for shielded and unshielded uranium spheres with masses as small as 0.08 kg are 26
found. The estimated maximum dose is generally so low that reasonable order tomography of 27
interesting portions of a container should be possible.28
29
30
1. Introduction31
32
The possibility that clandestine fissionable material might be secreted in intermodal containers 33
with cargo mass of up to ~ 27 Mt is recognized as a major problem for national and international 34
security. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu) of relatively low masses (≤ 0.5 35
kg) can be detected under a wide range of cargo conditions by neutron irradiation and 36
subsequent measurement of b-delayed high-energy g rays following fission (ref. 1,2) The same 37
should be possible by irradiation with very intense high-energy bremsstrahlung, and b-delayed 38
neutrons also can be detected under some conditions with high efficiency. Nevertheless, these 39
methods of so-called "active" interrogation will produce at least some activation of the cargo and 40
thus are unlikely to be used as a primary means of screening of all cargo containers. 41
42
The distribution of the types, masses and container-volume averaged densities of commodities 43
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found in a sampling of cargo containers has been reported by Descalle, Manatt and Slaughter 44
(ref. 3). The averaged density was found to be ~ 0.2 g cm-3 with less than ~ 2% at the theoretical 45
maximum density of ~ 0.65 g cm-3. The fraction of all cargos with averaged densities ≥ 0.4 g 46
cm-3 was about 10%. Because of the known real densities of materials such as ceramics, stone 47
products, iron and steel, organic chemicals and foodstuffs, a substantial fraction of cargos 48
through which interrogating radiation must penetrate will have densities ≥ 1 g cm-3. 49
50
At the present time, the only practical method for rapid screening of large cargo containers 51
without significant activation of a cargo is by radiographic techniques using readily-available 52
bremsstrahlung sources (see, e.g., ref. 4). Because of the need for high penetrability, such 53
sources will likely have endpoint energies of E ≥ 6 MeV. The Department of Homeland Security 54
of the United States of America (DHS) is now developing the Cargo Advanced Automated 55
Radiography System (CAARS) for general-purpose screening of all containers. Such a system 56
must, among other requirements, be sufficiently sensitive that it can detect cubes of high atomic 57
number elemental material (Z ≥ 72) at normal densities and with a volume of 100 cm3 behind up 58
to 10 in. (25.4 cm) of steel anywhere in the container (ref. 5). The CAARS specifications 59
provide that the probability for false negative signals for this case must be no more than 1 in 60 60
and the probability for false positive signals must be no more that 1 in 200. A 100 cm3 volume 61
would contain ~ 2 kg of uranium or plutonium metal. No requirements have yet been set for 62
determining the presence of objects of arbitrary size and shape.63
64
Even without considering the detection of arbitrary objects of high atomic number, the 65
difficulties in approaching the CAARS requirements are formidable. The nominal dimensions of 66
a standard intermodal cargo container are 6 - 12 m (length) x 2.4 m (height and width). Because 67
the materials in commerce that control the average content of most cargos are composed of 68
elements with atomic numbers Z ≤ 30, the mass attenuation coefficients for photons with 69
energies in the range ~3 - 9 MeV are all very similar and can be approximated as ~ 0.032 cm2 g-170
for scaling purposes (ref. 6). They are dominated by the contribution from incoherent scattering. 71
At the maximum cargo loading, the average density is ~ 0.6 g cm-3, and the fraction of incident 72
photons in this energy range that penetrate uncolloided through the nominal width of a 73
homogeneously-filled container is ~ 6 x 10-3, the fraction that would penetrate 25.4 cm of steel 74
uncollided is ~ 1.9 x 10-3, and the fraction that would penetrate both the 25.4 cm of steel and a 75
4.64-cm thick cube of uranium is ~ 3.6 x 10-5.76
77
These estimates demonstrate not only that the total attenuation is expected to be very large but 78
also, by inference, the majority of photons emerging from the container will have suffered at 79
least one scattering event. For example, Monte Carlo simulations of the irradiation of the 80
homogeneously-filled container considered above with a narrow 9-MeV endpoint 81
bremsstrahlung beam (see below) show that the intensity of events from scattered photons in a 82
thick detector, even with an energy discriminator level (Ed) of 3 MeV, is about 3 times that 83
expected from uncollided photons alone. In the presence of an additional 25.4 cm of steel, the 84
intensity of detected scattered events with Ed ≥ 3 MeV is about 8 times that from uncollided 85
photons. Thus, under a significant range of conditions expected to be found in practice, the 86
intensity of uncollided photons that carry the spatial information needed for localization of an 87
object of interest and for defining its attenuating characteristics will be carried by but a small 88
fraction of the radiation emanating to a detector.  While correction for scattered photons is not at 89
all new to radiography, the magnitude of the scattered intensity expected in cargo interrogation 90
far exceeds that normally met with in medical and most industrial applications. We have found 91
no publication in the open or patent literature that directly addresses this problem.92
93
In this manuscript, we wish to demonstrate that the simple physics of Compton scattering, 94
combined with the slowing down characteristics of highly-relativistic electrons and the general 95
properties of the most cargos, may provide a path for development of an effective and sensitive 96
screening mechanism for actinides in elemental form. Further, because of the relatively low total 97
dose that must be delivered to a cargo, a procedure might be developed that is not life 98
threatening to stowaways and allows for tomography of reasonable order in cases where such an 99
approach would be advantageous. Because the dimensions of an object must be known if an 100
attenuation coefficient is to be extracted, we assume that at least two orthogonal views through 101
the container will be acquired.102
103
104
2. General Theoretical Considerations105
106
2.1 Photon Transport in Cargo107
108
Bremsstrahlung radiation with energies significantly less than ~ 2 MeV will be much more 109
strongly attenuated in the highly-attenuating media considered here than those of higher energy 110
and thus will not contribute greatly to the photon spectrum emanating from a container. In the 111
Compton limit, single incoherent interactions of 4-9 MeV photons result in scattered photons 112
with energies less than 3 MeV when the photon scattering angle is q ≥ 300, for which the 113
fraction of total incoherent interactions is ≥ 0.6. Further, and neglecting photoelectric absorption, 114
more than 85% of the photons emerging from the homogeneously-filled container described 115
above will have suffered at least two incoherent scattering events.  Thus it is reasonable to 116
conclude that the majority of photons emerging from the container that have suffered more than 117
a single Compton event can be suppressed by simple energy discrimination in the range ~2-3 118
MeV. With such discrimination, the resultant signal in an external detector will be due primarily 119
to the desired uncollided photons and photons that have suffered but a single incoherent 120
scattering. Given the general characteristics of the cargo fill that can be gleaned from the cargo 121
manifest and weight, the fraction of the signal intensity due to single scattered photons should be 122
easily estimated with the Compton scattering formalism. Along with the requirement that at least 123
two orthogonal radiographs are acquired to provide an estimate of the dimensions of an object of 124
interest, the ability to provide reasonable detection efficiency with sufficient spatial resolution 125
for effective imaging rests on the spatial requirements for stopping of high-energy Compton 126
electrons produced in an external detector.127
128
2.2 Detector Response129
130
The Compton electrons from scattering of photons with energies in the range 4-9 MeV at angles 131
≤ 300 are found at angles within about 200 of the trajectory of the incident photons. Further, for 132
electrons with kinetic energies in the same range, the probability for undergoing large-angle 133
scattering before losing the majority of their kinetic energy by slowing down is small. 134
Calculations based on the Møller scattering relation (see, e.g., ref. 7) show, for example, that the 135
probability of scattering at an angle of 20o in the laboratory coordinate system is smaller by 136
factors of about 20-25 compared to electrons of energy 0.1 MeV. Thus, the majority of the 137
kinetic energy of most high-energy electrons produced in an external detector will be deposited 138
in a relatively small volume about the trajectory of the incident photon. As an example, the 139
fractions of total energy deposited within cylindrical volumes about the trajectories of incident 140
electrons are shown in Figure 1 as functions of radial dimension and initial electron kinetic 141
energy. These results were obtained in simulations with the code MCNP4C using the high-142
resolution electron transport option (ref. 8). The detector was modeled as a common plastic 143
scintillator of composition C10H11 and density of 1.03 g cm-3 (ref. 9). On the average, more than 144
70% of the electron energy is deposited within a radial dimension r ≤ 0.8 cm. This implies that145
146
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Figure 1. The fraction of electron kinetic energy deposited within a radial dimension r 150
about the initial trajectory of an incident electron in a plastic detector (see text). The 151
numbers adjacent to the various curves are the incident electron kinetic energies in MeV. 152
Statistical errors in the simulations are generally within the size of the symbols.153
154
155
the spatial resolution for interesting objects using a 9 MeV bremsstrahlung spectrum can be on 156
the order of ≤ 1.5 cm in such a detector. For the common scintillators NaI(Tl) or Bi4Ge3O12, the 157
spatial resolution can be smaller by factors of ~ 1.5 - 3.0, respectively, owing to their larger 158
electron densities, although some correction must be made for bremsstrahlung losses in the case 159
of Bi4Ge3O12.160
161
162
3. Monte Carlo Simulations163
164
The methodology outlined above has been examined with schematic simulations of a number of 165
shielded and unshielded spheres of uranium and several other test objects. For all simulations the 166
cargo container was assumed to have the nominal dimensions given above and was filled with 167
water at a density of 0.6 g cm-3. The bremsstrahlung spectrum was modeled from a 9 MeV 168
electron beam interacting with a 2-cm thick tungsten target centered at 208 cm from the entrance 169
face of the container and located on its centerline. A narrow bremsstrahlung beam was taken as 170
that emerging from a spherical surface of 37.3 cm radius surrounding the target and collimated 171
to provide a fan beam in the vertical direction. The horizontal width of the beam at entrance to 172
the cargo container was 1.73 cm and diverged to 3.76 cm at entrance into the detector located 173
immediately adjacent to the opposite face of the container at a distance of 244 cm. For some 174
simulations a wide beam 18.2-cm in width was produced by translating the narrow beam in 175
horizontal steps of 1.5 cm.176
177
As discussed above, the detector was modeled as a plastic scintillator with dimensions of 50 cm  178
(height) x 50 cm (width) and 6" (15.4 cm) thickness.  Photon interactions were allowed to occur 179
throughout the detector volume and electron transport was used to define the total energy 180
deposited in various interaction volumes. To simulate the response of a pixilated detector, the 181
detector surface was divided into an array of 1.5 cm x 1.5 cm areas. The energy deposited in a 182
detector pixel was defined as that deposited in the volume swept by projecting the pixel surface 183
through the detector.  The response of a more realistic scintillator comprised of individual 184
parallelepipeds separated by lead foils sufficiently thick to prevent transmission of electrons, 185
scintillation light and low-energy bremsstrahlung was shown by simulations to provide 186
essentially the same results for high energy radiations although the total count rates were 187
reduced by about a factor of 2. The total average attenuation of 3-9 MeV photons traversing the 188
thickness of the detector was ~ 0.35. The detector efficiency per bremsstrahlung source photon 189
was obtained by direct comparison of the intensities in pixels in the absence of a target and with 190
and without the water fill. This efficiency was used to normalize the results from the simulations 191
to the results from the first Compton scatter calculations.192
193
The thrust of all simulations and analyses presented here is to judge the efficacy of the proposed 194
approach for providing high-quality linear attenuation coefficients from which detection of high-195
Z fissionable materials can be ascertained in massive cargos. For this purpose, it is assumed that 196
the dimensions of an object are known and that the only errors are those due to the estimated 197
statistical errors inherent in the simulated intensities in the detector pixels.198
199
3.1 Test of the Concept200
201
A simple test of the general concept outlined above was obtained by the simulation of a 2-cm 202
radius totally absorbing sphere located at the center of the filled cargo container that is 203
interrogated by the narrow bremsstrahlung beam defined above. The intensities (lineouts) of 204
events per source photon in the vertical line of pixels passing through the centerline of the target 205
are shown as a function of discrimination energy in Figure 2. As the threshold level is raised 206
from 1 eV to 3 MeV, the intensity in non-target and target pixels decreases by a factor of about 207
7-8 and 55, respectively.  In Figure 3 are shown the effective linear attenuation coefficients as a 208
function of discrimination energy as estimated in the normal manner by calculating the quantity209
210
meff =
1
xobj
ln ¢ I 
I
(1)211
212
where I' is the average intensity in a non-target pixel and I is the intensity in the central target 213
pixel.214
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Figure 2. Intensities (lineouts) in the vertical column of pixels along the centerline of a 2-219
cm radius totally absorbing sphere located at the center of cargo container filled 220
homogeneously with water at a density of 0.6 g cm-3.221
222
The calculated meff are seen to increase by a factor of about 3 as the discrimination level is 223
raised from about 1 eV to about 3 MeV.  The error bars shown represent only the 1 s statistical 224
uncertainties in I and I' estimated in the Monte Carlo simulations. The lower limit indicated by 225
the underlined arrow represents the meff obtained by applying the analytical estimate of the first-226
Compton scattering intensity with the procedure outlined in the Appendix. Within the statistical 227
errors, the resultant meff is consistent with the infinite value expected.228
229
This simple test supports the central ideas that, in the main, energy discrimination removes the 230
majority of multiple-scattered incident photons and that the remaining scattered intensity can be 231
estimated reasonably well from the simple physics of Compton scattering. These conclusions are 232
further supported by analytical considerations and other simulations with the homogeneously-233
filled container in the absence of a target. In particular, the strong dependence of the energy of 234
scattered photons on the scattering angle means that high-energy scattered photons reaching a 235
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Figure 3. Effective linear attenuation coefficient, meff , extracted from the Monte Carlo 238
simulations shown in Figure 2 as a function of detector discrimination level.239
240
241
target pixel can only arise from interactions that take place within a fairly small transverse 242
dimension about the incident photon's trajectory.243
244
245
3.2 Simulations of Shielded and Unshielded Uranium and Rhodium Spheres.246
247
The methodology discussed here has been applied to simulations of an array of targets, including 248
uranium spheres with radii of 1, 2 and 3 cm, a 2-cm radius uranium sphere contained within 2-249
cm thick spherical shells of iron and lead, and a 2-cm sphere of rhodium, the element with the 250
largest linear attenuation coefficient outside of the actinides. The smallest uranium sphere 251
represents a case for which the object is comparable in size to the pixel dimension while the 252
largest uranium sphere approaches that of a totally absorbing object. The Monte Carlo 253
simulations were performed in the same manner as described in Section 3.1, i.e., all targets were 254
located at the center of a cargo container that was otherwise filled with water at 0.6 g cm-3. In 255
the case of the 3-cm radius sphere of uranium, the water contained in the 25.4-cm thick slab 256
immediately adjacent to the beam entrance was replaced by the same thickness of iron in order 257
to provide a simulation somewhat more stringent than that specified in the DHS requirements 258
discussed in Section 1.259
260
In all cases, meff of the object of interest was calculated from equation (1) using the simulated 261
intensities with a 3 MeV discrimination level.  The intensity I was taken as that in the central 262
target pixel and the intensity I' was taken as the average intensity in the five non-target pixels 263
just removed from the target region, both intensities corrected for scattering above the 264
discriminator level with the model given in the Appendix. For simplicity, it was assumed that 265
the object itself was totally absorbing in applying the scattering model. With the exception of the 266
case of a uranium sphere shielded in a spherical shell of iron discussed further below, this 267
approximation is reasonable but somewhat conservative. No corrections were made for the 268
divergence of the bremsstrahlung beam that leads to magnification of the target in the detector 269
plane. 270
271
The total target thickness penetrated by unattenuated photons that interact in the central target 272
pixel was taken as the mean cord length through a sphere over the pixel width. To compare the 273
derived meff with those expected, spline fits to tabular values of m r from ref. 6 were averaged 274
over the simulated bremsstrahlung spectrum in the energy range 3-9 MeV and then multiplied 275
by the normal density of the element. For shielded spheres, the meff derived in this way were 276
again averaged by the mean cord lengths through the spherical cores and spherical shells.277
278
As examples, the intensities from the vertical columns of detector pixels that contain the central 279
targets pixels for simulations of a 2-cm radius sphere of uranium contained in 2-cm thick 280
spherical shells of iron and lead are shown in Figure 4. For these simulations the 18.2 cm wide 281
beam was used. In both cases, the increase in detector threshold energy from 0.1 keV to 3 MeV282
283
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Figure 4. Intensities in vertical column of pixels containing the central target pixel for a 288
2-cm radius sphere of uranium inside of a 2-cm thick spherical shell of iron (left panel) 289
and inside of a 2-cm thick spherical shell of lead (right panel). The vertical axes of the 290
two panels are identical. Open circles - 0.1 keV detector threshold. Closed circles - 3 291
MeV detector threshold. Errors bars represent the estimated 1s statistical uncertainty in 292
the simulation only.293
294
295
reduces the intensities in non-target pixels by about a factor of 10 while the intensities in the 296
central target pixels are reduced by about a factor of 40. Although both targets have the same 297
dimensions, that for the iron-shielded uranium sphere appears to be significantly smaller in the 298
vicinity of the central target pixel than that of the lead-shielded sphere due to the rather high 299
transparency of the outer 1 cm of the iron. Also evident is the magnification of the target in the 300
detector plane because of the divergence of the bremsstrahlung beam.301
302
The simulation of the 3-cm radius uranium sphere in the presence of a 25.4-cm thick slab of iron 303
at the beam entrance to the container is shown in Figure 5. Again the wide beam was used in the 304
simulation. The strong attenuation by the iron slab is immediately evident, the intensities in non-305
target pixels being smaller by a factor of about 130 compared to the intensities seen in Figure 4 306
when the detector discrimination level is 3 MeV. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the fact that 307
the iron also acts as a very strong scattering source, the uranium sphere is quite well visualized. 308
While the statistical quality of the simulation is poorer because of computational limitations, the 309
ratio of the average intensity in non-target pixels to that in the central target pixels is essentially310
311
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Figure 5. Intensities in the vertical column of pixels containing the central target pixel for 316
a 3-cm radius sphere of uranium behind a 25.4-cm thick slab of iron with the remainder 317
of the container filled with water at a density of 0.6 g cm-3. Errors bars represent the 318
estimated 1s statistical uncertainty in the simulation only.319
320
321
identical to that seen in Figure 2 for the totally absorbing sphere as it should be. A 3-cm radius 322
sphere of uranium is very nearly totally absorbing to 3-9 MeV photons. This indicates, at least 323
qualitatively, that the addition of a strong scattering source does not greatly change the relative 324
intensity of high-energy photons that scatter into the target pixels.325
326
A summary of the principal parameters from 7 of the simulations considered in this work is 327
given in Table 1 and the meff extracted from the simulations and the first scattering model are 328
compared to those expected from the attenuation properties of the target in Figure 6. As seen in 329
the summary and the figure, the application of energy discrimination, coupled with the first 330
Compton scatter estimates that assume the target to be totally absorbing, lead to linear 331
attenuation coefficients that agree with the expected values to within about 1 s except for case c. 332
As discussed previously (see Figure 4), the outer portion of the iron shield is relatively 333
transparent to the high-energy photons considered here. Simple analytical estimates show, for 334
example, that the transmission of the outer 1 cm of the iron to photons in the energy range 3-9 335
MeV is about 0.4. Because first scatterings that result in photons near the source energy are 336
produced only at small scattering angles, this transparency has a significant effect on the 337
intensity of the first scattering estimate. Indeed, an approximate calculation that includes this 338
transparency brings the extracted meff well within the 1 s limits of a one-to-one correspondence 339
with the expected value.340
341
342
Table 1. Summary of principal parameters of 7 simulations used to test the efficacy of the 343
energy discrimination plus first scattering model approach.344
target thicknessd (cm) mexpected (cm-1) meff (cm-1)b meff / mexpected 
water cargo 244.000 0.020c 0.020 ± 0.003 1.00 ± 0.15
Rh sphere (r = 2 cm) 3.369 0.467 0.463 ± 0.022 0.991 ± 0.047
U sphere (r = 2 cm) in 
2-cm thick Fe shell a
5.333 0.549 0.435 ± 0.067a 0.792 ± 0.122a
U sphere (r = 2 cm) in 
2-cm thick Pb shell
5.333 0.603 0.524 ± 0.079 0.869 ± 0.131
U sphere (r = 2 cm)  3.369 0.851 0.892 ± 0.057 1.048 ± 0.067
U sphere (r = 3 cm) + 
25.4-cm thick Fe slab
4.000 0.850 0.801 ± 0.271 0.942 ± 0.319
U sphere (r = 1 cm) 1.684 0.851 0.764 ± 0.093 0.898 ± 0.109
345
a uncorrected for transparency through outer portion of the iron shell. See text.346
b uncertainties due solely to estimated statistical uncertainties in the Monte Carlo intensities.347
c for water at a density of 0.6 g cm-3.348
d mean thickness of target averaged over the dimension of the central pixel.349
350
351
4. Discussion352
353
354
The simulations and analysis presented above suggests that it is indeed possible to determine the 355
linear attenuation coefficient of isolated objects of normal elemental density with sufficient 356
accuracy that a reliable and efficient screening procedure might be developed based on a single 357
endpoint energy bremsstrahlung beam. The fundamental issue is the ability to distinguish 358
between high-Z objects that might contain fissionable material and lower atomic numbers within 359
the limits for false positive and false negative signals desired by the DHS. In Figure 6 are shown 360
approximate limits for the false positive and false negative detection rates specified for CAARS 361
calculated with rough estimates of uncertainties in the attenuation coefficient of the cargo and 362
the dimensions of an object. With the exception of some shielding conditions, both limits might 363
be met with detailed development of the proposed methodology. Although not presented here, it 364
may be completely possible to improve the identification of high-Z objects by analysis of 365
various energy ranges of the detected events.366
367
The majority of the simulations were performed with about108 histories. Commercial 368
bremsstrahlung sources can produce roughly 1012 photons s-1. Assuming that general purpose 369
scanning must be accomplished in about 1 min, a 40' (12.2 m) cargo container, and a beam 370
width on the order of 10 cm, the maximum count rates in an individual pixel would be less than 371
about 5 x 104 s-1. Such rates should permit energy discrimination in the detection system with 372
standard electronics and techniques. For objects such as the 3-cm radius sphere of uranium 373
shielded by 25.4 cm of iron, which required 1010 histories to produce the statistical quality 374
shown in Figure 5, it is assumed that much longer data acquisition times will be permitted if 375
warranted. Further, a reasonable number of angular projections can be acquired in a relatively 376
short time where they might prove useful to better define the attenuation characteristics of 377
suspect objects in cluttered environments.378
379
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Figure 6. The meff extracted from the Monte Carlo simulations and the first Compton 384
scattering correction versus the expected linear attenuation coefficient. All simulations 385
assume that targets are located at the center of a cargo container otherwise  filled 386
homogeneously with water at a density of 0.6 g cm-3. Errors bars represent the estimated 387
1s statistical uncertainty in the simulation only. a- water cargo; b - Rh sphere (r = 2 cm); 388
c - U sphere (r = 2 cm) in 2-cm thick Fe shield; d - U sphere (r = 2 cm) in 2-cm thick Pb 389
shield; e - U sphere (r = 2 cm); f - U sphere (r = 3 cm) + 25.4-cm thick Fe slab; 390
g - U sphere (r = 1 cm).391
392
393
The dose that might be received by a human during scanning was estimated with a crude 394
phantom model in the case where 108 histories were simulated. If a person were stationary in the 395
container, the whole body dose was estimated to be roughly 200 mrad. If the individual 396
traversed the container along with the bremsstrahlung beam, the estimated dose was about 2 rad. 397
398
The quality of the linear attenuation coefficients estimated in this work was somewhat 399
compromised by the simplicity of the implementation of the first scattering model. Nevertheless 400
they should be illustrative of what might be expected in practice for isolated objects in a 401
container with a homogeneous cargo fill. Because of the makeup of most cargos, and assuming 402
that the cargo manifest and weight are known, it should be possible to obtain a reasonable 403
estimate of the effective density and attenuation coefficient of the cargo from the two orthogonal 404
radiographs assumed here. Our experience with photon transport in a similar energy range for 405
examining the use of delayed g rays for detecting fissionable materials has shown that apart from 406
significant streaming paths, the requirement of homogeneity should not be a serious limitation. 407
Whether cargo clutter will be a significant limitation and whether there is any hope of 408
distinguishing non-elemental objects containing actinides still awaits study. 409
410
Finally, we wish to point out that unequivocal definition of the presence of fissionable material 411
can be obtained by irradiation of the cargo container with higher-energy photons or with 412
neutrons with energies ≥ 7 MeV by detecting high-energy b-delayed g-ray emission. This could 413
be attained with the same detector system as envisioned here with a dual-purpose interrogation414
system. This would provide a very powerful deterrence against the secretion clandestine nuclear 415
materials in cargo containers.416
417
418
5. Appendix: First Scattering Approximation419
420
In Figure A.1 is shown a schematic of a cargo container from which the first scattering 421
approximation is derived. The width of the container is zo. Pixels associated with the position of 422
an interesting object are contained within the dimension 0 ≤ xt ≤ w. The container is irradiated 423
with bremsstrahlung photons incident normally on the container side opposite to the detector . 424
We consider here only the first scatterings of bremsstrahlung photons that are incident on the 425
detector plane over the dimension w ≤ x ≤ xo.426
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Figure A.1 End and top views of the geometry used for derivation of the 434
expression for calculating the intensity of events from single Compton scattering 435
of monoenergetic photons incident on the cargo container volume.436
437
Photons of intensity Io cm-2 are incident at the location x, y, z = 0, interact at the location x,y,z 438
by Compton scattering, and produce scattered photons that are directed along the trajectory r to a 439
point xt,yt,zt in the detector plane. The magnitude of r is r = x - xt( )
2 + y - yt( )
2 + z - zt( )
2[ ]1/2.440
441
The electron density is ne cm-3 and the differential Compton collision cross section for 442
unpolarized photons is es C q( ) cm2 str-1. With normal Cartesian and polar coordinate systems, 443
where q is the polar angle and f is the azimuthal angle, the element of solid angle between q and 444
(q + dq) and f + (f + df) is dw = sinqdqdf and the surface area subtended by this solid angle is 445
dS = r2dw . The total rate of scattering events from photons incident in the differential area dA 446
about the location (x, y, z = 0) that interact between z and (z + dz) and produce photons scattered 447
into dw is 448
449
neIoe
-mzs C (q)dAedzdw s
-1 (A.1)450
451
The flux of unattenuated first-scattered photons at the point (xt, yt, zo) produced from these 452
events is then453
454
df = e
-mr
r2
Ioe
-mzdAes C (q)cos(q)nedz cm
-2 s-1, (A.2)455
456
where  the factor cos(q) represents the projection of dS onto the plane surface of the detector.  457
The total flux of first-scattered photons per unit intensity Io at (xt, yt, zo) due to interactions along 458
the range 0 ≤ z ≤ zo is then 459
460
461
 df
IodA
= ne
e-mr
r2
e-mz es C (q )cos(q)dz
0
zo
ò , (A.3)462
463
where  e-mr accounts for attenuation of the scattered photons along the trajectory r. The energy 464
spectrum of the photons arriving at the detector plane is readily obtained from the normal 465
Compton relation466
467
 ¢ E (q) = Eo
1+ Eo
mec
2 (1- cos(q))
, (A.4)468
469
where Eo and ¢ E q( ) are the energies of the incident photon and scattered photon, respectively 470
and me is the rest mass of the electron.471
472
In the implementation used here, the incident photons were assumed to be normal to the face of 473
the cargo container and no account was taken for the divergence of the beam. Intensities of 474
scattered photons from incident monoenergetic photons incident over the range 0 ≤ x ≤ w were 475
calculated only at the center of 1 cm x 1 cm pixels located at the front face of the detector , 476
weighted for the intensity distribution of the bremsstrahlung spectrum and then normalized to 477
the Monte Carlo simulations by use of the simulated efficiency for photon detection. Further, it 478
was assumed that the target was totally absorbing and thus the first scattered intensity will be 479
underestimated to some extent.480
481
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